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C O M M E N T A R Y  
The “Great Writ” Reinvigorated? 
Habeas Corpus in Contemporary 
Canada 
 
D E B R A  P A R K E S *  
I. INTRODUCTION 
n his engaging essay delivered at the 2nd Annual DeLloyd J Guth 
Visiting Lecture in Legal History at Robson Hall in 2012, “Habeas 
Corpus, Legal History and Guantanamo Bay,”1 Professor James 
Oldham provides insight into the contemporary debates in the United 
States about the scope and significance of the ancient writ of habeas corpus. 
In Canada, there has also been controversy in recent years about the 
availability of habeas corpus review and its relationship to other remedies 
and avenues for judicial review of imprisonment and other forms of 
detention. There are some significant similarities, as well as divergences, 
between Canadian, American, and British law with respect to the 
doctrine, procedure, and availability of habeas corpus. This short prelude to 
Professor Oldham’s article will not seek to canvass those substantial bodies 
of case law and commentary.2 Rather, it will discuss some of the ways the 
                                                     
*  Associate Professor and Associate Dean (Research & Graduate Studies), Faculty of 
Law, University of Manitoba. My thanks go to Brendan Harvey for his able research 
assistance which was funded by the Social Justice and Human Rights Research fund, 
Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba. 
1 2012 36:1 Man LJ 361 (This Volume). 
2 See generally, Judith Farbey, RJ Sharpe, & Simon Attrill, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 
3d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); David Clarke & Gerard McCoy, The 
Most Fundamental Legal Right: Habeas Corpus in the Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford 
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writ has played, and should continue to play, an important role in 
promoting access to justice and protecting basic liberty interests, 
particularly in these law and order times. The focus will be on 
developments in the law since the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 
was enacted, touching on two important features of a modern doctrine of 
habeas corpus – namely flexibility and gap-filling, both of which Professor 
Oldham also develops in his essay.  
II. HABEAS CORPUS IN PRE-CHARTER CANADIAN LAW 
The writ of habeas corpus, described by Blackstone as “the great and 
efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement,”4 functions as a 
vehicle to challenge the legality of detention. In the Canadian context, 
habeas corpus has been available to challenge a wide variety of detentions 
including those on mental health grounds, in connection with military 
service, and with respect to extradition.5 There are also some high profile 
examples of its suspension – for example, during the 1970 “October 
Crisis” in which nearly 500 people were arrested and detained (87% 
ultimately without any charge being laid) when the federal government 
invoked the War Measures Act6 in response to a hostage-taking by radical 
Quebec nationalists.7  
Habeas corpus is a potentially powerful remedy in the sense that it is 
not discretionary. It is distinct from the prerogative writs such as those for 
certiorari and prohibition in that it issues as of right8 (and the prisoner 
should be released) if the detention is determined to be unlawful, 
                                                     
University Press, 2000); Cameron Harvey, Habeas Corpus in Canada (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1974). 
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11. 
4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 1765, vol 3 at 131, cited in 
Allan Manson, “The Effect of Steele on Habeas Corpus and Indeterminate 
Confinement” (1991) 80 CR (3d) 282 at 285. 
5 Harvey, supra note 2 at ch 2.  
6       SC 1914 (2d session), c2, s1. 
7 Dominique Clément, "The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses Under the 
War Measures Act" (2008) 42:2 J Can Stud 160.  
8 As discussed infra, this principle was recently affirmed in May v Ferndale, 2005 SCC 82 
at para 33, [2005] 3 SCR 809 [May v Ferndale]. 
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provided the applicant is not seeking to subvert or circumvent the normal 
processes of appeal from conviction.9 However, as will be discussed further 
below, in the context of proliferating specialized statutory and 
administrative regimes throughout the 20th century, Canadian courts 
have sometimes declined to exercise jurisdiction to review the legality of 
detention. The extent to which courts were (and are) willing to use the 
writ of habeas corpus to fill gaps in rights protection left by these various 
statutory regimes continues to be an important question in Canadian law. 
As a practical reality, for people imprisoned in Canadian 
penitentiaries and jails from the 19th century and most of the 20th 
century, habeas corpus offered little protection from rights abuses and other 
illegal treatment. Vestiges of the common law concept of “civil death” (the 
loss of civil and proprietary rights upon criminal conviction) led courts to 
adopt a deferential, “hands off” approach to correctional decision-making 
such that abuses and illegalities went unremedied. In his ground-breaking 
1983 book, Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement in Canada,10 Michael 
Jackson described the effect of this hands-off approach as “immuniz[ing] 
the prison from public scrutiny through the judicial process and … 
plac[ing] prison officials in a position of virtual invulnerability and 
absolute power over the persons committed to their institutions.”11 It was 
not until a series of riots and other violent incidents broke out in 
penitentiaries across Canada in the 1970s that courts began to move away 
from their “hands-off” doctrine.12 In the landmark decision in Martineau v 
Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board13 the Supreme Court held that 
prisoners were entitled to procedural fairness and could seek judicial 
review of decisions by prison officials that deprived them of their “residual 
liberty” (i.e., through placement in segregation), stating that “[t]he rule of 
law must run within penitentiary walls.”14  
                                                     
9 Manson, supra note 4 at 285, citing Goldhar v R, [1960] SCR 431, 25 DLR (2d) 401.  
10 Michael Jackson, Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1983). 
11 Ibid at 82.  
12 Michael Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls: Human Rights in Canadian Prisons (Vancouver: 
Douglas & McIntyre 2002) at ch 3 [Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls].  
13 [1980] 1 SCR 602, 106 DLR (3d) 385 [Martineau cited to SCR]. 
14 Ibid at 622. 
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III. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE CHARTER 
For Canadian prisoners, the writ of habeas corpus took on new 
significance in the 1980s with its entrenchment in the Charter and, in 
practical terms, through the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Miller 
trilogy15 which affirmed that the writ is available to prisoners 
notwithstanding the statutorily mandated jurisdiction of the Federal 
Court to grant prerogative remedies against federal decision-makers.16 The 
court ruled that habeas corpus is available “to challenge the validity of a 
distinct form of confinement or detention in which the actual physical 
constraint or deprivation of liberty, as distinct from the mere loss of 
certain privileges, is more restrictive or severe than the normal one in an 
institution.”17 As such, the writ, with certiorari in aid, was available to 
challenge the legality of placement in segregation (Cardinal) as well as 
transfers to a Special Handling Unit from a maximum security prison 
(Morin and Miller) since these actions involved deprivations of the 
prisoners’ residual liberty interests. Finally, the court emphasized that the 
remedy of habeas corpus, “as the traditional means of challenging 
deprivations of liberty” must remain open to prisoners despite the 
concurrent jurisdiction of the Federal Court to hear judicial review 
applications from prison decisions.18  
At the same time as the Miller trilogy was winding its way to the 
Supreme Court, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted, 
with section 10 providing that “[e]veryone has the right on arrest or 
detention... (c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of 
habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.” In applying 
section 10(c) in R v Gamble,19 the Supreme Court emphasized the flexible 
nature of the habeas corpus remedy and warned against “plac[ing] 
                                                     
15 R v Miller, [1985] 2 SCR 613, 24 DLR (4th) 9 [Miller cited to SCR]; Cardinal v Kent 
Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643, 24 DLR (4th) 44 [Cardinal]; and Morin v Canada 
(National Special Handling Unit Review Committee), [1985] 2 SCR 662, 24 DLR (4th) 71 
[Morin]. 
16 In keeping with its status as a non-discretionary remedy, habeas corpus was not 
included in the list of possible orders that the Federal Court could grant.  
17 Miller, supra note 15 at 641. 
18 Ibid. 
19 [1988] 2 SCR 595, 45 CCC (3d) 204 [Gamble cited to SCR]. 
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procedural roadblocks in the way of someone like the appellant who is 
seeking to vindicate one of the citizens’ most fundamental rights in the 
traditional and appropriate forum.”20 Janise Gamble had been sentenced 
for murder under the wrong provision of the Criminal Code during the 
transitional time after capital punishment was abolished. Having assumed 
jurisdiction on the basis of habeas corpus (notwithstanding that a criminal 
appeal would have been the normal route) in this application brought over 
ten years into the sentence, the Supreme Court exercised its broad 
remedial powers pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter and ordered Ms. 
Gamble eligible for parole forthwith. 
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided another important case on the 
scope of habeas corpus, Steele v Mountain Institution,21 the application of 
which led to a substantial narrowing of the availability of the remedy to 
federal prisoners for the next 15 years. Theodore Steele successfully 
applied for habeas corpus review of his indeterminate sentence as a 
“criminal sexual psychopath” which had been in effect for 37 years by the 
time the Supreme Court granted his application. Holding that his 
continued detention constituted cruel and unusual punishment contrary 
to section 12 of the Charter, the Supreme Court ordered him released with 
certain conditions. However, evidently out of concern that the courts not 
be flooded by applications for habeas corpus challenging the substantive 
merits of prisoners’ continued detention, Cory J held that Mr. Steele 
should have proceeded by way of judicial review in Federal Court since the 
errors that had kept him detained so long were part of the parole decision-
making process.  
Justice Cory’s recommendation against establishing an unwieldy 
parallel system of adjudication was transformed by subsequent provincial 
appellate decisions into a rule that superior courts should decline to 
exercise their habeas corpus review in the prison context. In decisions such 
as Spindler v Millhaven Institution22 and Hickey v Kent Institution23 provincial 
appellate courts declined to exercise their habeas corpus jurisdiction on the 
                                                     
20 Ibid at 635. 
21 [1990] 2 SCR 1385, 60 CCC (3d) 1. 
22 (2003) 15 CR (6th) 183, 110 CRR (2d) 173 (Ont CA)[Spindler]. 
23 2003 BCCA 23 (available on WL Can) [Hickey]. See also Armaly v Canada (Correctional 
Service), 2001 ABCA 280, 299 AR 188; St-Amand v Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 
147 CCC (3d) 48 (available on WL Can) (Qc CA). 
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basis that the prisoner applicants should have proceeded via judicial 
review in Federal Court. At issue in Spindler was a policy implemented by 
the Commissioner of Corrections requiring anyone convicted of murder 
to serve at least two years in a maximum security prison, even where the 
government’s own security classification criteria pointed to a lower security 
classification. This policy change was prompted by much-publicized (and 
politicized) criticism from victim’s rights groups to the effect that 
murderers who were classified as medium or minimum security were not 
being suitably punished. The decision at issue in Hickey was a transfer to 
the ultra-high security Special Handling Unit. In both cases, and in other 
decisions involving similar issues,24 prisoners’ residual liberty interests 
were implicated. Yet the appellate courts held that courts should decline 
to exercise their habeas corpus jurisdiction on the basis that the internal 
prison grievance system and/or judicial review in the Federal Court 
amounted to “a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for review 
of a decision affecting the prisoner’s confinement.”25 These courts were 
treating habeas corpus as a discretionary remedy,26 and were assuming that 
the alternatives open to prisoners (particularly the internal grievance 
procedure, followed by judicial review proceedings in Federal Court) 
provided adequate and timely justice. These assumptions were challenged 
successfully in May v Ferndale Institution,27 a case which provided the 
Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify its comments in Steele and 
to affirm the importance of habeas corpus review in the prison context 
where, as I and others have argued elsewhere,28 the potential for abuse and 
illegality is great and the need for judicial oversight is particularly acute.  
                                                     
24 Ibid. 
25 Hickey, supra note 23 at para 50. 
26  This characterization runs contrary to the nature of habeas corpus as a writ that issues if 
the legality of the detention is not proved: “unlike certiorari or mandamus, a writ of 
habeas corpus is of right to every man [sic] who is unlawfully detained. If a prima facie 
case is shown that a man is unlawfully detained, it is for the one who detains him to 
make a return justifying it,” R v Pentonville Prison Governor, [1973] 2 All ER 741, [1973] 
2 WLR 949 (Eng CA), cited in Charles B Davidson, “Whittling away at Greatness: 
The Narrowing of the Availability of Habeas Corpus” (2004) 15 CR (6th) 192 at 201-
202. 
27 May v Ferndale, supra note 8. 
28 See e.g. Kim Pate & Debra Parkes, “Time for Accountability: Effective Oversight of 
Women’s Prisons” (2006) 48 Can J Crim & Crim Just 251; Debra Parkes, “A 
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IV. REINVIGORATING THE WRIT FOR PRISONERS 
Terry May and other prisoners were serving life sentences in a federal 
prison when they were automatically reclassified from minimum to 
medium security and involuntarily transferred to a higher security prison. 
Their reclassification was due to a change in policy whereby completion of 
a certain anti-violence program was required to maintain minimum 
security status. They applied to the British Columbia Supreme Court for 
habeas corpus review, with certiorari in aid, arguing that the reclassification 
decision was arbitrary and that they were denied procedural fairness since 
the Correctional Service had failed to disclose the scoring matrix used to 
reclassify them. The application for habeas corpus was dismissed at first 
instance on substantive grounds29 but the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal held that the British Columbia Supreme Court ought to have 
declined to exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction on the basis that the 
“specialized” Federal Court was the appropriate venue for prisoner 
litigation of this kind.30 
After reviewing the history of the “hands-off” doctrine and the 
subsequent expansion of habeas corpus review in the Miller trilogy, the 
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Spindler approach which had 
effectively turned the limited discretion to decline to exercise habeas corpus 
jurisdiction into a rule against the writ’s availability in prison cases. The 
Court strongly affirmed the availability of habeas corpus review in provincial 
superior courts in these and other circumstances involving the residual 
liberty interests of prisoners:  
Given the historical importance of habeas corpus in the protection of various 
liberty interests, jurisprudential developments limiting habeas corpus jurisdiction 
should be carefully evaluated and should not be allowed to expand unchecked. 
                                                     
Prisoner’s Charter? Reflections on Prisoner Litigation under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms” (2007) 40 UBC L Rev 629; Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls, 
supra note 12; The Hon. Louise Arbour, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain 
Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston (Canada: Public Works and Government 
Services, 1996). 
29 Bauman J relied on Milller, supra note 15 in finding that he had jurisdiction to hear 
the application, but went to conclude the reclassification was lawful: May v Ferndale 
Institution, 2001 BCSC 1335 (available on WL Can). 
30 May v Ferndale Institution, 2003 BCCA 536 at para 21 (available on WL Can) citing 
Spindler, supra note 22. 
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The exceptions to habeas corpus jurisdiction and the circumstances under which a 
superior court may decline jurisdiction should be well defined and limited. ... In 
principle, the governing rule is that provincial superior courts should exercise 
their jurisdiction. However, in accordance with this Court’s decisions, provincial 
superior courts should decline habeas corpus jurisdiction only where (1) a statute 
such as the Criminal Code… confers jurisdiction on a court of appeal to correct 
the errors of a lower court and release the applicant if need be or (2) the 
legislator has put in place complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for 
review of an administrative decision.31 
The Court rejected the argument that the internal prison grievance 
system was comparable to the independent adjudication of immigration 
appeals which had been found to be a “complete, comprehensive and 
expert” review procedure.32 The Court bolstered the case for enhanced 
judicial oversight of prisons by describing the internal grievance procedure 
as suffering from “structural weaknesses”.33 Speaking for the majority, 
Justices LeBel and Fish cited the following factors as weighing in favour of 
provincial superior courts exercising habeas corpus review in prison cases, 
concurrent with the availability of judicial review in the Federal Court: (1) 
the choice of remedies and forum (jurisdiction is concurrent, not 
conflicting); (2) the expertise of provincial superior courts (they are well-
versed in Charter and criminal law which are highly relevant in the prison 
context); (3) the timeliness of the remedy (habeas corpus review can 
commence on 6 days notice compared to 160 days in Federal Court); (4) 
local access to the remedy (as emphasized in Gamble); and (5) the nature of 
the remedy and the burden of proof (habeas corpus issues as of right where 
the government has not discharged its burden of proving legality whereas 
the Federal Court can deny relief on discretionary grounds).34 
                                                     
31 May v Ferndale, supra note 8 at para. 50 [emphasis added]. 
32 Peiroo v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 69 OR (2d) 253, 60 
DLR (4th) 574 (Ont CA), leave to appeal refused, [1989] 2 SCR x. Post-May, 
Canadian courts continued to decline to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction in relation 
to immigration detention (Apaolaza-Sancho c Director of Établissement de détention de 
Rivière-des-Prairies, 2008 QCCA 1542); involuntary detention pursuant to mental 
health law (Capano v Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, 2010 ONSC 1687); and 
extradition proceedings (Thailand v Saxena, 2009 BCCA 223) on the basis that the 
relevant legislation established a “complete, comprehensive and expert” review 
procedure. 
33 May v Ferndale, supra note 8 at para 64. 
34 Ibid, at para 65-71. 
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The majority went on to find the instant decision — reclassifying Terry 
May and others from minimum to medium security — to be unlawful 
because the scoring matrix, used in the reclassification decision, was not 
disclosed to the prisoners.35 This failure to disclose the scoring matrix on 
the basis that it was unavailable (when in fact it was available but it was the 
Correctional Service’s practice not to disclose it) was characterized by 
Justices LeBel and Fish as “highly objectionable” and “misleading”.36 In so 
ruling, the majority seemed to grasp the difficulties faced by prisoner 
litigants in challenging the decisions of authorities who hold all the power 
and much of the relevant evidence. For prisoners’ rights advocates, May 
was a most welcome decision.37 
V. CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE WRIT 
Access to the courts to review the legality of detention is a critical 
check on government power in these times of political expediency in the 
name of law and order and national security. For example, the federal 
government has recently announced its intention to extend the time 
between reviews of detention under the mental disorder provisions of the 
Criminal Code. This proposed change, which is an apparent response to 
public outcry over a few high profile cases of violence involving mentally 
disordered accused,38 may prompt an application for habeas corpus review if 
enacted.39 
                                                     
35 Ibid, at para 112. 
36 Ibid, at para 110-111. 
37 Of course, access to justice is crucial to ensuring that any remedy is actually 
enforceable. There is very limited legal aid funding available across the country to 
facilitate prison litigation, which makes the relevant rights and remedies illusory for 
many prisoners. See e.g. Debra Parkes et al, “Listening to Their Voices: Women 
Prisoners and Access to Justice in Manitoba” (2008) 26 Wind YB Access Just 85 at 
116-118. 
38 Brian Morton, “Ottawa to address safety concerns about releasing mentally ill 
offenders”, The Vancouver Sun (22 November 2012) online: Vancouver Sun < 
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Ottawa+introduce+bill+keep+more+mentally+o
ffenders+behind+bars/7596636/story.html>. 
39  Habeas corpus review is already playing a gap-filling function, providing a remedy to 
mentally disordered accused persons who are detained in jail rather than in forensic 
beds due to lack of resources and coordination. See Janet Leiper, “Cracks in the 
Façade of Liberty: The Resort to Habeas Corpus to Enforce Part XX.1 of the Criminal 
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Similarly, recent amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act40 authorize the detention, without judicial review for one year and 
with limited access to the administrative tribunal, of individuals whom the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration designates as “irregular arrivals” 
(i.e., through an alleged human smuggling event).41 This new regime may 
require a revisiting of the controversial ruling in Peiroo that immigration 
law provides a “complete, comprehensive and expert review procedure” 
which has meant that superior courts will generally decline to exercise 
habeas corpus jurisdiction in immigration cases. In Charkaoui v Canada, 
Chief Justice McLachlin made it clear that “foreign nationals, like others, 
have a right to prompt review to ensure that their detention complies with 
the law. This principle is affirmed in section 10(c) of the Charter.”42 The 
provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act which failed to 
allow for review of the detention of foreign nationals until 120 days after a 
security certificate was confirmed were found to violate section 10(c).43 In 
these and other contexts, it is hoped that the flexibility and gap-filling 
functions of the habeas corpus remedy will continue to develop in a manner 
deserving of the “great writ of liberty.”  
                                                     
Code” (2009) 55 Crim LQ 134. 
40 Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced 
Refugee Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012 (Assented to 28 June 2012), 
SC 2012, c 17.  
41 Ibid at s 20.1(1). For critical commentary on this legislation, see “Bill C-31” Canadian 
Association of Refugee Lawyers (9 July 2012), online: CARL, Bill C-31 
<http://www.refugee lawyersgroup.ca/billc-31>. 
42 Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para 90, 276 DLR 
(4th) 594. She went on to note that this right is also recognized internationally, citing 
Rasul v Bush, 542 US 466 (2004) and some European cases. 
43  Charkaoui, ibid, at para 90. 
